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Motivations and Implications of Community Service Provision
by La Familia Michoacána / Knights Templar and other Mexican
Drug Cartels
Abstract
Research demonstrates that service provision by violent organizations can be an effective
strategy for coercing the local community to accept and conceal a group’s violent activities,
and for creating loyalty to these groups. This has been most frequently explored among
political organizations such as terrorist groups, with organizations like Hezbollah and
Hamas very visibly engaged in providing social welfare in addition to their violent
activities. Recent reports indicate that criminal organizations in Mexico also are involved in
instances of public service provision in local communities. This article explores the extent
to which drug cartels operating in Mexico are involved in public service provision to
members of communities where they operate, and considers possible motivations and
implications for public service provision by these criminal organizations, with specific
attention to the organization La Familia Michoacána/ Knights Templar. The article also
gives attention to the consequences to citizenship and government of service provision by
violent nonstate actors, and the ways such service provision may disrupt the social contract
between the citizen and the state.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/5

Flanigan: Motivations and Implications La Familia Michoacána / Knights Templar

Introduction
At first glance, provision of public services and other types of seemingly
charitable behavior by violent organizations may seem counterintuitive.
However, a number of violent political groups such as insurgent groups and
terrorist organizations are actively involved in public service provision,
sometimes at the level of a quasi-state. Evidence suggests that terrorist
organizations engage in other less formalized service provision as well. Scholars
have suggested that there is a relationship between service provision by violent
organizations and political support from service recipients, and have indicated
that organizations use service provision strategically to generate support.1
Research demonstrates that service provision by violent political organizations
like terrorist groups can be an effective strategy for coercing the local community
to accept and conceal a group’s violent activities. Groups such as Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine are very visibly engaged in providing social
welfare in addition to their violent activities, and scholars suggest that effective
service provision is an important factor creating loyalty to these groups.2
However, fewer studies have sought to examine the extent to which provision of
social aid is used as a strategy among non-political groups that use violence, such
as drug cartels and other organized crime groups.3
Social service provision and other aid by criminal organizations are documented
in some communities, such as Brazilian favelas or shantytowns and inner-city

1 Shawn Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s social jihad: Nonprofits as resistance
organizations,” Middle East Policy 16 (2009): 122-137; Shawn Flanigan, “Charity as resistance:
Connections between charity, contentious politics, and terror,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
29 (2006): 641-655; Shawn Flanigan, “Nonprofit service provision by insurgent organizations –
The cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008): 499519; Hamzeh, A.N., In the path of Hizbullah, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004);
Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the system: Sources and implications of popular support
for Lebanon’s Hizballah,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40 (1996): 41–67; James Kostelnik and
David Skarbek, “The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization,” Public Choice
(2013):156; Levitt, Matthew, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Matthew Levitt, “Hamas from cradle to grave,” Middle
East Quarterly 11(2004): 1–12; G. Usher, “Historical development of Hizballah: Hizballah, Syria,
and the Lebanese elections,” Journal of Palestine Studies 26 (1997): 59–67.
2 Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Exchanging favors: The predominance of casework in legislators’
behavior in Jordan and Lebanon.” Journal of Legislative Studies 15:4 (2009): 420-438; Flanigan
and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad”; Flanigan, “Nonprofit service provision by insurgent
organizations”; Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah; Harik, “Between Islam and the state; Levitt,
Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad; Levitt, “Hamas from cradle to
grave”; Usher, “Historical development of Hizballah”; Ora Szekely, “Social Services as Advertising
for Nonstate Military Actors: The Case of Hamas,” (paper presented at the International Studies
Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, April 1st-4th, 2012.)
3 The provision of social assistance by criminal groups, which is the focus of this article, is less
studied than extralegal governance and particularly protection services provided by criminal
organizations. The literature on extralegal governance and protection services, which has
important ties to the topics covered in this article, includes works such as Gambetta, Diego, The
Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993);
Hill, Peter E, The Japanese mafia: yakuza, law, and the state, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003); Marina Tzvetkova, “Aspects of the evolution of extra-legal protection in Bulgaria (1989–
1999).” Trends in Organized Crime 11:4 (2008): 326-351; Varese, Federico, The Russian Mafia:
Private Protection in a New Market Economy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Wang,
Peng. "The Chinese mafia: private protection in a socialist market economy." Global Crime 12:4
(2011): 290–311.
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neighborhoods in Kingston, Jamaica.4 Several Japanese organized crime groups,
or yakuza, are reported to have been involved with disaster relief following
Japan’s 2011 earthquake.5 Media reports indicate that drug cartels in Mexico, in
particular La Familia Michoacána/Knights Templar (in Spanish Los Caballeros
Templarios), are involved in ad hoc provision of public services in local
communities. However, the breadth and nature of cartels’ informal giving
behavior and more formalized service provision are poorly understood.6 This
article explores the extent to which drug cartels operating in Mexico are involved
in public service provision to members of communities where they operate, and
considers possible motivations for public service provision by criminal
organizations in Mexico. Because of the comparatively high activity of La
Familia Michoacána /Knights Templar in this realm, this article gives particular
attention to that group. This article aims to further elucidate an underexplored
mechanism that violent groups use to gain compliance and support from
community members. The article also examines the implications to the state of
public service provision by criminal organizations, and particularly the ways such
service provision may disrupt the social contract between the citizen and the
state.

Methodology
The article uses qualitative data from a variety of sources. Interviews were
conducted during 2010-2012 with twenty-four experts that including academics,
journalists, public servants, and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers
in Mexico and the U.S. border region. Because of the sensitive nature of this
topic, the participants were recruited through a convenience sample,
supplemented by snowball sampling. The interviews were conducted by the
author by phone and in person in Mexico and the United States. All interviews
were confidential and in the interest of the safety of the participants, neither the
exact date, location of the interview, nor the exact profession of specific
participants is included here.7

4

Enrique Desmond Arias, “The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in
Rio de Janeiro.” Journal of Latin American Studies, 38 (2006): 293-325; Enrique Desmond Arias,
“Faith in our Neighbors: Networks and Social Order in Three Brazilian Favelas,” Latin American
Politics and Society 46 (2004): 1-38; Gay, Robert, Lucia: Testimonies of a Brazilian Drug Dealer's
Woman (Philidelphia: Temple University Press, 2005); Rivke Jaffe, “Crime and Insurgent
Citizenship: Extra-state rule and belonging in urban Jamaica,” Development, 55 (2012): 219–223
5 For descriptions of aid by Japan’s Inagawa-kai, Sumiyoshi-kai, and Yamaguchi-gumi, see Jake Adelstein,
“Yakuza to the rescue,” The Daily Beast. March 18, 2011; Jake Adelstein , “Mobsters on a mission: How
Japan's mafia launched an aid effort,” The Independent. April 9, 2011; and Terril Yue Jones, “Yakuza among
first with relief supplies in Japan,” Reuters. March 25, 2011.
6 It is worth noting that some experts and government agencies prefer the term "drug trafficking
organizations" to “drug cartel” because “cartel” often refers to price-setting groups, and it is not
clear that Mexican drug cartels are involved in this practice, see Cook, Colleen W, CRS Report for
Congress: Mexico's Drug Cartels (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008).
However, because the term “drug cartel” still dominates, that is the term that will be used in this
article.
7 Throughout the article I refer to “expert interviews” but do not list location, profession, or other
information because I guaranteed interview participants this confidentiality. While this may seem
overly cautious, some interview participants have faced threats of violence, and one had a family
member kidnapped, when it was known they had spoken publicly about cartel activities. Interview
participants therefore understandably were only willing to participate in this study with a very
broad guarantee of confidentiality.
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The interview data is heavily supplemented with data drawn from content
analysis of articles from seventy-nine electronically available Mexican
newspapers. An effort was made to incorporate all electronically searchable
newspapers in Mexico into the study. Available newspapers ranged in
publication date from 1980 to 2010, and all available articles from throughout
this period were searched. Appropriate articles were identified through webbased searches using twenty-four key words and additional key word
combinations. See Appendix A for a list of the newspapers examined, and
Appendix B for a list of key words used. The newspaper search was used in large
part to identify the types of social aid provided by drug cartels (see Table 1), and
by which cartels aid was provided. In many cases the articles contained a very
brief reference to or description of the aid being provided, and as such this
information was used primarily to determine categories of aid. In those instances
when a more detailed description was provided, that information was integrated
into the literature review.

Motivations for service provision: Utilitarian or Ideological?
Why would violent organizations be involved in informal giving and more
formalized public service provision? Motivations for political groups such as
terrorist organizations are typically characterized as belonging to two broad
categories: utilitarian or ideological.8 It is important to note, however, that these
categories need not be mutually exclusive; in the cases of many terrorist
organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, there are clearly both utilitarian and
ideological aims, and public choice economists indicate publicizing ideology such
as religious ideology in fact can be a utilitarian strategy.9
As will be discussed in more detail later, service provision can serve as a
utilitarian tool used to create dependence within the local population and/or
generate good will among the local population. A relationship of dependency
gives the organization substantial power over the community it serves, and thus
allows the organization to demand tolerance of or active participation in its less
desirable activities by the local population. Beyond the coercive power associated
with dependence, service provision also may be successful at generating genuine
good will toward the violent actor.10 Such has been the case for criminal groups
in Jamaica, where dons (leaders of criminal groups) provide services ranging
from welfare support and employment assistance to protection and dispute
adjudication.11 While a credible threat of violence is part of what underpins the
dons’ authority, Jaffe argues that inner-city residents’ public demonstrations
protesting the imprisonment or extradition of dons indicate that support for
these leaders is genuine.12
8

Flanigan, “Charity as resistance.”
Berman, Eli, Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 2009); Kostelnik and Skarbek, “The governance institutions of a drug trafficking
organization.”; Throughout the article I make occasional comparisons to Hamas and Hezbollah,
rather than other terrorist organizations, because these organizations typically are familiar even to
those who are not terrorism experts, and because they are very sophisticated service providers.
10 Abdel-Samad, “Exchanging Favors.”; Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad.”;
Flanigan, “Nonprofit service provision by insurgent organizations.”; Flanigan, “Charity as
resistance.”
11 Jaffe, “Crime and Insurgent Citizenship.”
12 Ibid.
9
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Service provision may also be motivated by political or religious ideology, as often
is the case with many terrorist organizations that have clear political and/or
religious goals. Taking the examples of Hamas and Hezbollah, both
organizations view themselves as representing repressed minority groups, and
thus have an ideological commitment to resistance. Both groups also are actively
involved in electoral politics. In addition, Hamas and Hezbollah espouse an
Islamic identity, and are called by their faith to engage in service to the less
fortunate.13 While ideological motivations may not be unheard of in criminal
organizations, as will be discussed later, one expects that organizations with a
predominantly economic orientation like drug cartels in Mexico would be
engaged in giving behavior comparatively less frequently than politically active
terrorist organizations, and would engage in such behavior solely for utilitarian
purposes. The article will explore the extent to which service provision occurs
among Mexican drug cartels, and if ideology may play a role.

Scope of Service Provision
There is evidence that Mexican drug cartels are engaged in ad hoc service
provision, though current information seems to indicate that service provision by
Mexican cartels generally is less frequent and less formalized than service
provision by Brazilian gangs or Jamaican dons. The exception in Mexico may be
La Familia Michoacána, a cartel that disbanded and then reconfigured itself as
the Knights Templar in early 2011 (and hereafter will be referred to as LFM/KT.)
It is somewhat inaccurate to refer to La Familia Michoacána and Knights
Templar as a single organization, since Knights Templar is an offshoot of La
Familia Michoacána and at times has actively competed with the former
organization.14 However, for simplicity’s sake in this article I refer to the
organizations jointly because of the similarity in service provision and ideology
across Knights Templar and its “mother” organization La Familia Michoacána,
and a level of continuity in the organizations’ services, tactics, and leadership. In
the instances where the article refers to the organizations individually, it referring
to the organization before Knights Templar was formed, or because there is a
distinguishing characteristic to note.
LFM/KT seems to be engaged in more extensive and formalized efforts at service
provision. However, it is important to note that of the types of services listed in
Table 1, only one (drug rehabilitation clinics) was found to be offered only by
LFM/KT, and the content analysis generated reports that all of the major cartels
in Mexico (Sinaloa, Tijuana/Arellano-Felix organization, Juárez/Vicente Carillo
Fuentes organization, Beltrán Leyva organization, Los Zetas, Gulf, and LFM/KT)
have offered at least one service, even if only on a one-time or ad hoc basis.
Table 1: Scope of Service Provision by Mexican Drug Cartels
Short-term relief
Emergency food aid, housing, medication, etc.
Health services
Operation of drug rehabilitation clinics (LFM/KT
13 Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s social jihad.”; Flanigan, “Charity as resistance.”;
Flanigan, “Nonprofit service provision by insurgent organizations.”; Hamzeh, In the Path of
Hizbullah; Harik, “Between Islam and the state; Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in
the Service of Jihad; Levitt, “Hamas from cradle to grave.”; Usher, “Historical development of
Hizballah.”; Ora Szekely, “Social Services as Advertising.”
14 June S. Beittel, “Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations,” Trends in Organized Crime (2012): 15.

66
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.3.4

Flanigan: Motivations and Implications La Familia Michoacána / Knights Templar

Infrastructure
Provision of
Utilities
Education
Agricultural
assistance
Loans
Justice
Administration

only); purchasing of health services/medications for
individuals on an ad hoc basis
Building and repairing churches, homes, roads,
schools
One-time payments/improvements enabling provision
of water and electricity
Provision of books and supplies for students
Agricultural loans, assistance with applying for federal
agricultural assistance from Mexican government
Low-interest personal and business loans
Justice administration and dispute adjudication

In contrast to the extensive and highly formalized systems of service provision
among some terrorist organizations, service provision by Mexican drug cartels is
relatively less frequent, less visible, and shorter-term. As one expert who was
interviewed noted,
“The patronage here usually takes the form of throwing some money
around. So the local drug lord might pay for refurbishing the church or
building a school, that sort of thing. Not the soup kitchens and more
mundane, sustained stuff…”
However, the fact that organizations not involved in traditional politics are
engaged in service provision of any sort is of interest. In some cases the level of
aid is considerable, ample enough that one Mexican journalist says of certain
cartel leaders, “they dignify the way of life of the poor.”15
Most reports of service provision and giving activity by cartels such as the Gulf
Cartel, Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Cartel, and others are described as short-term or
one-time events. These include public works projects such as repairing churches
and schools, paving roads, creating parks and community centers, and building
sidewalks, and occasionally larger scale projects such as ensuring the provision of
electricity or potable water.16 More common are events such as giveaways of toys,
food, or clothing to the poor.17 Cartels are also often reported to be involved in
agricultural finance, either through grants, low-interest loans, or assistance with
seeking support from Mexico’s Ministry of Agriculture. In exchange farmers are
expected to shift at least part of their agricultural production to marijuana or
poppies.18

15

Gabriel Zendejas, “Policía: En la mira…” La Prensa (April 22, 2009).
Expert interview, 2011; William Finnegan, “Silver or Lead,” New Yorker (May 31, 2010): 38-51;
Kevin Flores, “Marijuana Greenhouse,” Ovaciónes (March 15, 2010); Miguel Granados, “Blessed
Money Laundering,” Excelsior. (April 8, 2008); Vivian Kerlegan “Cartel Parties,” La Cronica (May
7, 2006); Zendejas, “Policía: En la mira…”
17 Expert interviews, 2011; Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”
18 Jose Aguilar “El narco financia al campo, afirma el Tribunal Agrario,” El Sol de México (February
28, 2011); Carlos Avilés, “Organized crime is taking over the field,” El Universal (February 17,
2010); Cruz López Aguilar “Suple narcotráfico la falta de créditos a campesinos,” El Heraldo de
Tabasco (February 20, 2010); Organización Editorial Mexicana, “Aumenta participación de
campesinos en el narcotráfico,” El Sol de Cordoba (August 26, 2008); Nayeli Roldán, “El Narco,
modelo ideal para los campesinos mexicano,” Milenio Online (October 29, 2010).
16

67
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 3

As one interview participant notes, “most "social works" carried out by Mexican
cartels are done largely for propaganda purposes.” Another expert states,
“I wouldn't call their behavior altruistic; rather I think they're being
highly strategic and are using their impressive financial power to win
hearts and minds, or at least delegitimize the federal and state
government.”
According to STRATFOR Global Intelligence, cartels in Mexico generally do not
provide large scale services or make a strong effort to gain popular support from
the local population. Cartel leaders do occasionally attempt to “buy loyalty” from
local residents by paying for basic necessities or for a child’s education, and cartel
leaders have been known to provide financial support to the families of members
who were captured or killed while performing services for the cartel.19 As one
interview participant indicates, “The behavior of the cartels is capitalism in its
purest form.” As such, cartels engage in short-term, one-time charitable events
that serve a public relations purpose, not unlike the charitable activity of many
businesses and corporations.20
In contrast to most other Mexican cartels stands La Familia Michoacána, a cartel
originating in the Mexican state of Michoacán, from which a second organization
Knights Templar emerged in early 2011. LFM/KT provides many of the same
services as other cartels, such as aid to the poor for food and medicine, public
works projects, and low-interest loans.21 As one Michoacán resident notes, “If
you were sick and had no money, they'd take you to the hospital and pay for
medicine. If you couldn't afford tortillas, they'd buy some for you.”22 However,
according to expert opinion and media reports, LFM/KT offers public services on
a larger scale, such as more wide spread provision of low-interest loans, and
operating over a dozen rehabilitation centers for alcoholics and drug addicts.23
As will be discussed later, it is thought that these rehabilitation centers serve as
recruiting ground for the cartel.24 In addition, LFM/KT is reported to be engaged
in governance activities far beyond the social aid activities that are the topic of
this article, including regulating the prices of agricultural products and
establishing harvesting periods, giving licenses for forestry activities, giving
permits for festivals and religious events, and creating sanctions and punishing
crimes such as domestic violence and theft.25 While it is not yet empirically
certain that state functions have been replaced by those offered by LFM/KT, it is
clear that many citizens rely upon the parallel resources provided by the cartel.26
In fact, given this array of parallel governance activities, Aguirre and Herrera go
19

STRATFOR Global Intelligence, Organized Crime in Mexico (Austin, TX: STRATFOR Global
Intelligence, 2008).
20 Expert interview, 2011.
21 Expert interviews, 2011; Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”; Grayson, George W., La Familia Drug
Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).
22 Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”
23 Expert interview, 2011; Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”; Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel.
24 Aranda, “Stories of Drug Trafficking in Rural Mexico."; Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel.
25 Jerjes Aguirre and Hugo Amador Herrera, “Institutional weakness and organized crime in
Mexico: the case of Michoacán,” Trends in Organized Crime (2013):16; Salvador Maldonado
Aranda, “Stories of Drug Trafficking in Rural Mexico: Territories, Drugs and Cartels in Michoacán,”
Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe / European Review of LatinAmerican
and Caribbean Studies (2013): 94
26 Aguirre and Herrera, “Institutional weakness and organized crime.”
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so far as to say “drug trafficking is not a primary activity of La Familia
Michoacána.”27
LFM/KT’s more state-like quality is perhaps most apparent with the cartel’s
administration of justice in Michoacán. Administration and enforcement of
justice is not unknown among criminal organizations, and such extralegal
governance activities occur in many countries including Brazil, Bulgaria, China,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, and Russia.28 LFM/KT first became nationally known in
Mexico when members appeared at a nightclub in Uruapan, Michoacán in 2006
and dumped five severed human heads onto the dance floor. Local residents
indicate that these were the heads of five men involved in the rape and murder of
a local woman romantically involved with a LFM/KT member.29 LFM/KT left a
note behind indicating that “The Family doesn’t kill for money; it doesn’t kill
women; it doesn’t kill innocent people; only those who deserve to die, die.
Everyone should know. . . this is divine justice.”30 Since that time, LFM/KT has
become heavily involved in enforcing social order.31 In fact, in a newspaper
advertisement, LFM/KT explains its origins as follows:
“This organization sprang from the firm commitment to fight the out-ofcontrol crime that existed in our state…People who work decently at any
activity need not worry. We respect them, but we will not allow people
from here or from other states to commit crimes or try to control other
types of activities.”32
LFM/KT conducts its own investigations of crimes, determines individuals’ guilt,
and administers punishment as it sees fit.33 As a school teacher notes,
“They're a second law…Maybe the first law. If you need to collect a debt,
you go to them. They'll charge you a fee, but you'll get your money. The
police work for them. When they arrest people, they don't take them to
police headquarters but to La Familia.”34
The scope of LFM/KT’s activities has reached such breadth that an American
official in Mexico described the organization as looking less like a cartel and more
like an insurgency.35

Utilitarian Motivations: Silencing, Coercing, and Generating Support

27

Ibid, 225.
Arias, “The Dynamics of Criminal Governance.”; Arias, “Faith in our Neighbors.”; O. Bandiera,
“Land reform, the market for protection, and the origins of the Sicilian Mafia: theory and evidence,”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2003):19; Gambetta, Diego, The Sicilian Mafia:
The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Hill, The
Japanese mafia; Jaffe, “Crime and Insurgent Citizenship.”; Tzvetkova, “Aspects of the evolution of
extra-legal protection.”; Varese, The Russian Mafia; Wang, "The Chinese mafia.”
29 Expert interviews, 2011; Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel.
30 Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel, 1.
31 Expert interview, 2011; Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”
32 Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel,102-103.
33 Ibid.
34 As quoted in Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”
35 Ibid.
28
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One way to categorize service provision by violent organizations is as a utilitarian
tool to gain the acceptance and compliance of the community in which they
operate. Communities do not necessarily accept or support the violent activities
of organizations wholeheartedly, even in situations where politically motivated
organizations such as terrorist groups claim to be fighting to address community
members’ social and political concerns. One would imagine support is even lower
in communities where Mexican drug cartels operate since the cartels generally do
not claim to address the communities’ social or political grievances. In addition,
the violence generated by drug wars alienates drug cartels from local
communities. This gives communities more reason to cooperate with law
enforcement, meaning criminal organizations have an even greater incentive to
encourage the community’s tolerance of their illicit activities.36

The degree to which communities accept the activities of violent organizations is
variable, spanning across a continuum that ranges from a complete lack of
acceptance and active resistance to violent organizations; to passive acceptance of
violent activities due to subtle silencing and coercion; to widespread genuine
acceptance and the general favorable opinion from the community; to the active
participation of the community in violent activities. Violent organizations can use
charitable service provision as a tool to move community members along this
continuum of acceptance.37 In the case of Mexican drug cartels, the services,
employment, and other economic benefits offered by the cartel can serve to move
community members in a rightward direction along this continuum in the absence
of social and political goals (see Figure 1).38

Figure 1: Continuum of Community Acceptance of Violent Activities by
Community Members

36

Kostelnik and Skarbek, “The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization.”
Flanigan, “Charity as resistance.”
38 Ibid.
37
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Service provision can be a useful tool in this regard because of the power
dynamics that exist in service settings. Relationships between service providers
and service recipients are governed by the amount of power each can bring to the
exchange, and the amount of power a service provider has over the recipient is a
direct function of the recipient’s ability to obtain aid elsewhere.39 Service
recipients, especially the poor, often are not in a position to choose which
organizations to interact with, nor are they in a position to turn away services
that meet their basic human needs for food, medical care, housing, or education.
The common deficiency of state services or other service providers in low income
communities increases reliance on violent providers and increases the
community’s dependence on violent actors, particularly in countries that lack a
well-developed welfare state. When community members lack other options for
services, they possess little if any power and have few real options for choice.40
Many service recipients will be reluctant to express discontent with the
organization upon which they depend for their very survival, and may be willing,
be it eagerly or reluctantly, to do their bidding.41 As Levitt notes when discussing
service provision by a terrorist organization, “Recipients of such aid know better
than to ask questions when asked for a favor by Hamas.”42
A void in state service provision provides an opening for violent actors to gain the
allegiance of the community and undermine the authority of the state. It is
important to note that in Mexico, in some cases cartels themselves have created
the void by disrupting the state’s ability to engage in basic public service and
security functions.43 However, scholars from Michoacán attest that it was an
original underlying weakness of bureaucratic and political institutions in the state
that allowed organized crime and drug trafficking to flourish.44 Ideally,
researchers would be able to map cartel service provision against state service
provision, as well as against the activities of rival cartels, to see whether economic
wellbeing and/or group competition are determinant of cartels’ choice of service
39

Yeshenkel Hasenfeld, “Power in social work practice,” Social Service Review 61:3 (1987): 469–
483.
40 Ibid.
41 Flanigan, “Charity as resistance.”
42 Levitt, “Hamas from Cradle to Grave," 6.
43 Anthony T. Bryan, “Democracy and Security: Observations from Mexico, Central America, and
the Caribbean,” Latin American Policy 3:1 (2012): 88-101.
44 Aguirre and Herrera, “Institutional weakness and organized crime.”; Jerjes Aguirre Ochoa and
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provision as a strategy. At present, sufficiently extensive data on cartel service
provision simply does not exist, and security concerns hinder its collection.
However, the important role that an absence of state services plays is noted by
experts in Mexico, and experts repeatedly document high levels of poverty in
Michoacán, the Mexican state where we see the most evidence of large-scale
cartel service provision.45 An expert interviewed about LFM/KT indicates that
this cartel has filled a vacuum where the state and the Catholic Church have failed
to provide for the community. LFM/KT operates as a “shadow government”, and
has taken over what local government and what local human services agencies
normally would do. In doing so, LFM/KT “has this golden opportunity. The state
has just dished it up.”46 This expert described a resident in Michoacán who told
him “These people are crazy, and I am afraid of them, but if I need something
they are the only game in town.”47
This is not unlike the state incapacity often described in communities where
terrorist service providers operate. Referring to armed groups like Amal and
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Fawaz notes,
“The absence of the Lebanese State in providing services and the poverty
of the residents opened spaces in the suburbs for various political parties
to win the support of residents by providing these missing services.”48
Whereas the Lebanese state has been slow to address the concerns of its Shiite
population, Hezbollah’s “vast network of womb-to-tomb services… put
Hezbollah—or Party of God—on the map as the agency that gets things done.”49
Providing services that the Mexican state fails to provide, and providing these
services well, allows cartels like LFM/KT to delegitimize government and gain
genuine local support.50 A telling quote about a conversation with a resident of
Michoacán demonstrates this.
“The heavy deployment of troops and federal police in the area had forced
La Familia to lie low. So who would look after the poor now? The
government? Medina gave me an arch look, daring me to answer the
question. No, it would not… Local police were poorly paid and, therefore,
incompetent and corrupt. When La Familia was in charge, nobody
stepped out of line. You didn't even need to lock your door at night.”51

45 Michoacán as one of the poorest states in the country, with a poverty rate of 54.4 percent in 2012
and an overall Human Development Index score of .6958 in 2010, the sixth and fourth lowest
scores in Mexico, see Ian Kowalski, “Security Situation in Mexico Muddled by Citizen Community
Policing,” Washington Report on the Hemisphere, 30:17 (2013).
46 Expert interview, 2011.
47 Ibid.
48 Mona M. Fawaz, “Agency and Ideology in the Service Provision of Islamic Organizations in the
Southern Suburb of Beirut, Lebanon.” ; Paper presented at NGOs and Governance in the Arab
Countries Conference, Cairo, Egypt, 2000.
49 Quote from Prusher, Ilene R., “Through charity, Hizballah charms Lebanon,” Christian Science
Monitor (April 19, 2000); Kramer, Martin, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” I. Cronin, Confronting
Fear: A History of Terrorism (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002): 282–293.
50 Ibid; Kostelnik and Skarbek, “The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization.”
51 Quoted in Finnegan, “Silver or Lead,” 1.
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In line with this somewhat nostalgic-sounding recollection of LFM/KT’s rule,
Grayson states that some mothers in Michoacán praise the cartel for disciplining
their disorderly adolescent children.52
In Mexico, cartels’ services are likely to ensure the compliance and silence of the
local community. Referring to Joaquin "el Chapo" ("Shorty") Guzmán, the head
of the Sinaloa Cartel, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agent told the Associated
Press, “With Chapo, he's got the whole Robin Hood thing going…People in close
proximity to him might not be motivated to turn him in.”53 However, there is
some indication that LFM/KT also uses its services as a tool for recruitment,
using religion in its rehabilitation facilities to convert addicts into soldiers for the
cartel.54 LFM/KT’s recruiters present addicts with a message of hope, offering
the opportunity to enter a rehabilitation center and shed their addiction, and
afterward receive a job, salary, and membership in a social group. Individuals
enter a two-month Evangelical Christian program anchored in periods of silence
and intensive Bible study. If they complete this training, they become part of the
cartel and augment LFM/KT’s ability to move drugs through Mexico and the
United States.55 This intensive training period also allows the cartel to assess
individuals’ loyalty to their organization before making them members.56
Whether as a recruitment method or to generate good will, LFM/KT has shown
an interest in advertising its work on behalf of the poor in Michoacán in an effort
to demonstrate the value it adds to the community.57 Consider the following
public message, in which the newly configured Knights Templar described its
efforts to regulate food prices in the region,
“During past days, through an invitation, our brotherhood achieved a
lowering of the prices of meat and tortillas from the retailers, thus in
effect lowering the cost of these products. The invitation to lower prices
was accepted by our commercial and business friends and recognized by
the neediest people of our state, being that for this action neither
pressure, nor blackmail nor payments were made...”58
One could reasonably question whether this price reduction was truly as noncoercive as LFM/KT described. Nonetheless, the organization clearly expects this
news to be well received and generate good will among the people of the region.

Ideology as Motivation
Many violent political organizations, such as terrorist organizations, have clear
religious ties and unambiguous political and social goals. These goals make an
ideological motivation for service provision easy to understand. Both charitable
and violent activities by these organizations are depicted as a response to political
and social exclusion and grievance, and one can imagine these two types of
52
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activities as choices along a spectrum of possible actions that can be used to
address political and/or social concerns.59 In addition, many religious traditions
call upon their adherents to serve the poor, so one can understand how
organizations that express an explicitly religious orientation might be engaged in
service provision and charitable activity.60
In contrast, it would seem that Mexican drug cartels would be involved in service
provision solely for utilitarian purposes and that ideology would not play a role.
However, LFM/KT has a religious orientation, and presents itself as a
representative and protector of the people of Michoacán, opening a window that
ideological motivations might be at work for this organization. In a newspaper
advertisement LFM/KT posed the question, “Who are we?" answering,
"Workers from the Tierra Caliente region in the state of Michoacán,
organized by the need to end the oppression, the humiliation to which we
have constantly been subjected by people who have always had power."61
LFM/KT, who often communicates with the public through newspapers or
publicly displayed banners, also has insisted that the organization will disband
once the Mexican government demonstrates that it will adequately address the
needs of the people of Michoacán. These types of statements suggest that
LFM/KT claims to be a representative voice for citizens in Michoacán.62 Though
as a large commercial organization LFM/KT’s social aid still may be rational and
utilitarian, through these statements the organization at least purports to address
the economic, political, and social grievances of the people of Michoacán.
While LFM/KT does not propose to enter mainstream elective politics, these
statements nonetheless have a political premise that is unlike the motivations of
other cartels in Mexico. Drug cartels’ relationships with the Mexican government
are characterized by high degrees of collusion, corruption, and sometimes
violence.63 Cartels have a great deal of influence over the activities of politicians
and the bureaucracy, with some experts arguing that cartels exercise sufficient
control over the state to qualify as state capture.64 In some cases, criminal gangs
in Mexico use violence to impose their will upon elected officials and the
bureaucracy.65 Sullivan and Elkus go so far as to warn that Mexico is becoming “a
criminal-state largely controlled by narco-gangs.”66 However, while many
59Flanigan,

“Charity as resistance.”; Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s social jihad.”
Shawn Flanigan, For the Love of God: NGOs and Religious Identity in a Violent World (Sterling,
VA: Kumarian Press, 2010.)
61 Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”
62 Aguirre and Herrera, “Institutional weakness and organized crime.”; Expert interview, 2011.
63 Jennifer Hazen, “Gangs and Their Fiefdoms: Challenges to the State?” paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association, Montreal (March 16th-19th, 2011); For interesting analysis of La Familia
Michoacana’s relationships with the Mexican state, see Jerjes Aguirre and Hugo Amador Herrera,
“Institutional weakness and organized crime in Mexico: the case of Michoacán,” Trends in
Organized Crime (2013):16; Luis Jorge Garay-Salamanca and Eduardo Salcedo-Albarán,
“Institutional impact of criminal networks in Colombia and Mexico,” Crime Law and Social
Change (2012): 57.
64 Expert interviews 2010-2011; Hazen, “Gangs and their Fiefdoms.”; Adam David Morton, “FailedState Status and the War on Drugs in Mexico,” Global Dialogue (2011): 94.
65 Bryan, “Democracy and Security.”
66 John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “State of Siege: Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” Small Wars
Journal (2008): 1.
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Mexican cartels are very strongly entwined with the Mexican state and certainly
are savvy political actors, most do not claim to voice community grievances.
LFM/KT also has a decidedly religious orientation. Members of the cartel
reportedly attend church regularly, carry Bibles, and distribute Bibles in local
government offices.67 La Familia Michoacána spiritual leader Nazario Moreno
Gonzalez was said to be a Jehovah’s Witness convert who penned his own book of
religious teachings, sometimes referred to as a “bible”.68 One expert describes
this book as a “religious self-help tome mixed with old-time social justice
sloganeering.”69 Moreno Gonzalez is reportedly highly influenced by John
Eldredge, an American evangelist and author of the self-help bestseller Wild at
Heart, who promotes a highly masculine, “muscular” form of Christianity.70 The
book is reportedly studied in Spanish translation at LFM/KT training camps.71
The more recently created Knights Templar has initiation rituals for new
members that integrate religious symbols, such as wearing white robes with red
crosses.72
The cartel’s administration of justice mentioned earlier is described as “divine
justice” that is administered to those LFM/KT considers objectionable such as
rapists and thieves.73 The cartel’s leaders haze recruits by requiring them to
engage in particularly bloody and gruesome acts so they are, “prepared to do the
Lord’s work—that is, safeguarding women, combating competing cartels, and
preventing the local sale of drugs,” and leaders justify executions as “orders from
the Lord.”74 While it is not clear the degree to which LFM/KT members or the
public adhere to this particular religious philosophy, LFM/KT leaders certainly
have used religion as a rhetorical strategy to justify some of their most brutal
acts. While LFM/KT does not appear to discuss religious ideology as a
motivating factor for its charitable work, it couches its policing, punishment, and
conflict adjudication activities as part of a religious effort to purify Michoacán of
crime, drug use, and immoral behavior.
Even La Familia Michoacána’s new name Knights Templar seems to have been
chosen with attention to its ideological goals. The banners the organization used
to announce its name change declared, “Our commitment with society will be the:
safeguarding of order, preventing robberies, kidnappings and extortions and to
shield the state from rival organizations.”75 LFM/KT expert George Grayson
notes,
“It’s an interesting choice. The Knights Templar were known as a
charitable organization in the 12th century and were even recognized by
the pope in the 1130s for their good deeds. Also, they were the most
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vicious warriors in the Crusades. That may be the message they are trying
to send.”76

Reconciling Service and Violence
While cartel violence is not the subject of this article per se, it is worth
mentioning the dissonance some may feel when presented with both the social
aid cartels provide and the extraordinary violence they use. Mexican drug cartels
are notorious for their violent tactics, and stories of beheadings, mass graves, and
other atrocities are all too common. In addition to the elaborate community
services it provides, LFM/KT makes avid use of violent tactics. In fact, LFM/KT
is particularly known for its use of extreme, symbolic violence, and in 2009 was
declared Mexico’s most violent drug trafficking organization by Mexico’s attorney
general. La Familia Michoacána’s former spiritual leader Nazario Moreno
González, killed in 2010 in a battle with Mexican federal police, was known by the
alias “El Más Loco” or “The Craziest One” because of his violent acts.77 Yet in
spite of this brutality, when González died, the community marched in his honor,
carrying signs conveying their esteem for González and La Familia
Michoacána.78
This is not to say residents of Michoacán are entirely accepting of the violent acts
of LFM/KT. Perhaps most illustrative of this are the self-defense units that have
emerged in Mexico to impose a sort of vigilante justice upon drug cartels and
other groups engaged in practices found objectionable. These volunteer vigilante
groups have emerged in part as a response to cartel violence and extortion, and
are particularly numerous in the states of Guerrero and Michoacán. Thought to
operate in at least two dozen municipalities, these groups patrol towns, make
arrests, and punish those they deem criminals.79 As Matloff and Orlinsky explain,
“Many villagers welcome vigilantes as the only answer to the drug violence that
has killed so many thousands of Mexicans that hard numbers are impossible to
track.”80 However, these groups pose their own threat to security, with rumors
that self-defense units may be sponsored by a rival cartel or wealthy property
owners. The types of sophisticated weaponry self-defense volunteers display
feeds these suspicions.81 In early 2014, Mexican troops were sent to disarm
vigilante groups fighting with the Knights Templar in Michoacán, but ultimately
allowed them to join Mexican forces in an effort to decapitate Knights Templar.82
Since both service and violence can be used as tools of social control, perhaps
there is not much to reconcile after all. Kostelnik and Skarbek explicitly describe
both charitable acts and threats of violence as economically rational choices drug
trafficking organizations make in an effort to reduce community resistance to
their activities. As these authors explain, the benefits of service provision lure the
76

Ibid, 1.
Beittel, “Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations.”; Kostelnik and Skarbek, “The governance
institutions of a drug trafficking organization.”
78 Kostelnik and Skarbek, “The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization.”
79 Kowalski, “Security Situation in Mexico Muddled.”; Judith Matloff and Katie Orlinsky, “Mexico:
Vigilante Justice,” World Policy Journal (2014): 31
80 Matloff and Orlinsky, “Mexico: Vigilante Justice,” 63.
81 Kowalski, “Security Situation in Mexico Muddled.”; Judith Matloff and Katie Orlinsky, “Mexico:
Vigilante Justice.”
82 “Mexican army begins disarming vigilantes in Michoacan,” BBC News (April 28, 2014); Matloff and
Orlinsky, “Mexico: Vigilante Justice.”
77

76
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.3.4

Flanigan: Motivations and Implications La Familia Michoacána / Knights Templar

community to cooperate with LFM/KT, while simultaneously fear of violence
deters community members from turning against the organization.83 Even
formal states both provide services and use violence to control behavior, and less
democratic states are well known for using violence ruthlessly and
indiscriminately at times. Given this, perhaps a combination of service provision
and violence is simply to be expected of organizations engaged in extralegal
governance.

Conclusion
Implications of Criminal Service Provision for Citizenship and the State
This article serves as a preliminary examination of some reasons violent groups
are engaged in charity and public service provision, and the ways in which violent
groups use service provision as a tool. While the use of service provision by
terrorist organizations to gain political support and military recruits has been
acknowledged for quite some time, the fact that the strategy is used by other
violent groups without political aspirations is worthy of further study. This is
because public service provision by non-government actors has important
implications. As Cammett and MacLean note, non-state provision of services has
important political consequences including implications for state capacity, equity
of access to social welfare, and experiences of citizenship.84
Public service provision by non-state actors is essential in much of the developing
world, especially considering that in many cases states in the less developed
world provide very little to citizens. One might consider, for example, the
essential roles that NGOs, religious congregations, and others play in providing
aid in areas with high poverty and low levels of state service provision. However,
service provision by non-state actors is thought to have a number of possible
negative political consequences for states and for citizens. Some argue that nonstate service provision can undermine state capacity for service provision by
hindering the development of the state’s own capabilities and increasing reliance
on subcontractors and other actors.85 Non-state service provision may limit
equity in terms of the quality and quantity of services accessible to different
members of the community, and the qualitative experience of these accessing
services. Non-state provision may change citizens’ experiences of reciprocity
with the state, thereby changing their perception and practice of their citizenship
rights and duties.86
Given that the assertions above are made about a wide variety of non-state
service providers such as churches and other religious bodies, informal charities,
and NGOs, one can imagine how these consequences are further complicated
when the non-state provider under discussion is a violent and/or criminal group.
Bryan discusses the creation of alternatively governed spaces by transnational
and localized criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America, where the
criminal organizations serve as the effective administrations of a territory by
83
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collecting “taxes” and disciplining individuals who impede the organizations’
illegal activities.87 There is ample literature on such extralegal governance
activities by criminal organizations and other alternative authority structures.88
Because criminal organizations rather than state institutions control residents’
behavior, alternatively governed spaces in Mexico and other parts of Latin
America pose a threat to state sovereignty and the practice of democracy. Bryan
goes so far as to say this dynamic “is more than a national security problem; it is a
development problem that goes to the heart of democratic governance.”89 When
extralegal governance also includes the provision of social aid and public services,
the problem is compounded as loyalty to the state has more potential to be
divided.
Service provision by violent groups has important implications for democratic
accountability and for security and stability within states. As discussed earlier,
sole service provision creates dependency on a single provider and grants service
providers significant power over service recipients. When service providers are
criminal, violent groups, this power and dependency can have an important
impact on security and stability. In addition, democracy is weakened when
citizens turn to alternative sources, particularly sources that pose a threat to
security, for public service provision. When cartels or terrorist organizations
provide services that a government is unwilling or unable to provide, these
organizations upset the social contract between citizen and the state.
Government legitimacy is threatened because its leaders not only are not held
accountable by the citizenry; they are no longer viewed as necessary by citizens.90
As Hazen notes, “The more citizens that must seek security and other goods from
outside the democratic system, the less they will support that system.”91
It is important to note that nonstate services by violent providers are complex
and cannot be characterized solely as having negative implications for
citizenship. Service provision by political actors is not always indicative of a lack
of state political control, but may take place with the complicity and even
cooperation of government. Arias described networks among criminals, civic
leaders, politicians, and police in Rio de Janiero’s favelas that actually serve to
link favela residents into Rio’s broader political and social system in ways that
may not be possible otherwise.92 However, most examples are less positive for
citizens and for state legitimacy. Jaffe explains that in Jamaica, criminal
organizations function in a state-like manner, and inner-city residents have come
to understand their rights in relation to the local don, turning to the don for
justice, economic and physical security, and protection of their rights. Jaffe
argues that while donmanship does provide some of the rights, responsibilities,
87
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and participation commonly associated with citizenship, the system does so in a
manner that is limited and undemocratic, ultimately providing little equality and
recourse to residents.93
A better understanding of the implications of service provision by violent groups
should prove useful to policy makers and practitioners, particularly to criminal
justice professionals and government officials engaged in decision making
regarding community service provision. If service provision is shown to be an
effective means of generating support in low-income communities, aid can be
used strategically to undermine violent organizations and engender loyalty to
other political actors by strategically funding alternative NGO service providers
or local government social welfare agencies.
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Appendix A: Newspapers Included in Content Analysis
Name of Newspaper

Web address

Cambio
Centros de medios
independientes
Critica
Cronica De Campeche
Diario Chiapas Hoy
Diario de Mexico
Diario de Queretaro
Diario De Quintanaroo
Diario De Tampico
Diario Del Sur
Diario La Verdad
Diario Rotativo
Dossier Politico
El Bravo
El Cinco
El Corregidor
El Diario de Chihuaha
El Diario De Ciudad
Victoria
El Diario de Colima
El Economista
El Froterizo Del Sur
El Grafico
El Heraldo Aguas
Calientes
El Imparcial
El Informador
El Manana
El Manana De Reynosa
El Mexicano Gran Diario
El Norte
El Periodico De
Quintanaroo
El Porvenir
El Regional Buen Dia
El Siglo de Torreon
El Sol De Mazatlan
El Sol de Mexico
El Sol De San Juan De

http://www.diariocambio.com.mx/
http://mexico.indymedia.org/
http://www.critica.com.mx
http://www.cronicacampeche.com/noticias/index.php
http://www.chiapashoy.com/notashoy/
http://www.diariodemexico.com.mx/
http://www.oem.com.mx/diariodequeretaro/
http://www.dqr.com.mx/
http://impreso.milenio.com/Tampico/2010/02/09/
http://www.oem.com.mx/diariodelsur/
http://www.laverdadquintanaroo.com.mx/
http://www.rotativo.com.mx
http://www.dossierpolitico.com/
http://www.elbravomatamoros.com/
http://www.elcinco.net/
http://www.elcorregidor.com.mx/macnews-core00003/
http://www.eldiariodechihuahua.com.mx
http://www.eldiariodevictoria.com.mx/
www.eldiariodecolima.com.mx
http://eleconomista.com.mx/
http://www.elfronterizosur.com/
http://www.elgraficotam.com.mx/
http://www.heraldoags.net/www/
http://www.elimparcial.com/Home.aspx
http://www.informador.com.mx
http://www.elmanana.com.mx
http://www.elmananarey.com/
http://www.el-mexicano.com.mx/inicio.htm
http://www.elnorte.com/
http://www.elperiodico.com.mx/
http://www.elporvenir.com.mx
http://www.elregionalbuendia.com.mx
http://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx
http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldemazatlan/
http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldemex/
http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldesanjuandelrio/
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Rio
El Sol De Sinaloa
El Sol de Tijuana
El Sudcaliforniano
El Sur De Campeche
El Universal
En Linea Directa
Esfera Informativa
Estesur
Esto
Excelsior
Expresion En Red
Frontera
La Cronica
La Cronica de Hoy
La Jornada
La Jornada De Oriente
La Jornada en
Aguascaliente
La Jornada En Linea
La Jornada Guerrero
La Jornada Jalisco
La Jornada Michoacan
La Jornada Morelos
La Jornada San Luis
La Jornada Veracruz
La Jornada Zacatecas
La Prensa
La Tarde
La Tribuna De Campeche
La Verdad Del Sureste
La Voz de la Frontera
La Voz De Quintana Roo
La Voz Del Sureste
Milenio
Ovaciones
Periodico El Orbe
Reforma
Siglo 21
Sipse
Tabasco Hoy
Tribuna De Los Cabos
Ultima Hora

http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldesinaloa/
http://www.elsoldetijuana.com.mx
http://www.oem.com.mx/elsudcaliforniano/
http://www.elsur.com.mx/
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/noticias.html
http://www.enlineadirecta.info/
http://www.esferainformativa.com.mx/
http://www.estesur.com/
http://www.oem.com.mx.esto/
http://www.nuevoexcelsior.com.mx/home
http://www.expresionenred.com/
http://www.frontera.info/Home.aspx
http://www.lacronica.com/Home.aspx
http://www.cronica.com.mx/
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/02/11/index.php
http://www.lajornadadeoriente.com.mx/2010/02/12/puebla/puebla.php
http://www.lajornadaaguascalientes.com.mx/
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/
http://www.lajornadaguerrero.com.mx/2010/02/15/index.php
http://www.lajornadajalisco.com.mx/2010/02/15/index.php
http://www.lajornadamichoacan.com.mx/2010/02/15/index.php
http://www.lajornadamorelos.com/
http://www.lajornadasanluis.com.mx/2010/02/15/index.php
http://www.jornadaveracruz.com.mx/
http://www.lajornadazacatecas.com.mx/
http://laprensa.mx/
http://www.latarde.com.mx/
http://www.tribunacampeche.com/
http://www.la-verdad.com.mx
http://www.oem.com.mx/lavozdelafrontera/
http://www.lavozdequintanaroo.com.mx
http://www.diariolavozdelsureste.com/lavoz/
http://www.milenio.com/mexico/
http://www.ovaciones.com.mx
http://elorbe.com/
http://www.reforma.com/
http://www.siglo21.com.mx/
http://www.sipse.com/
http://www.tabascohoy.com.mx/
http://www.tribunadeloscabos.com.mx/newpage/
http://www.ultimahora.com.mx/
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Appendix B: Key Words Used in Content Analysis
Key Word List:

Key Word Combinations:

Asesinatos
Cartel/Carteles
Cocaína
Crimen organizado
Drogas ilícitas
Guerra contra las drogas
Guerra de drogas
Heroína
Los Zetas
Mafia
Mariguana
Mercado negro
Pandillas
Narco Asesinatos
Narco Guerras
Narcos
Narco secuestro
Narco terrorismo
Narco violencia
Secuestros
Traficantes
Trafico de drogas
Trafico de personas

Cartel/Carteles
Los Zetas
Mafia
Narcos
Pandillas
Traficantes

y ayuda a la comunidad
ayuda a sus familias
la pobreza
los pobres
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